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Abstract
In this work we develop methods for privatizing spatial location data, such as spatial locations of individual
disease cases. We propose two novel Bayesian methods for generating synthetic location data based on
log-Gaussian Cox processes (LGCPs). We show that conditional predictive ordinate (CPO) estimates can
easily be obtained for point process data. We construct a novel risk metric that utilizes CPO estimates
to evaluate individual disclosure risks. We adapt the propensity mean square error (pMSE ) data utility
metric for LGCPs. We demonstrate that our synthesis methods offer an improved risk vs. utility balance in
comparison to radial synthesis with a case study of Dr. John Snow’s cholera outbreak data.
1. Introduction
Individual disease case data offer scientists valuable information about the dynamics of on-going and past
disease outbreaks. Due to privacy risks, disease data are often not made publicly available. Synthetic data
sets offer reduced disclosure risks while preserving some of the scientific utility of the confidential data set
[17, 27]. In this work, we consider spatial disease case data: that is we consider data consisting of the spatial
locations of each individual with a particular disease. We develop methods for privatizing this fundamental
form of disease data. We propose two novel Bayesian methods for generating synthetic individual location
data based on log-Gaussian Cox processes (LGCPs). We demonstrate that leave-one-out LGCP densities can
easily be approximated by conditional predictive ordinates (CPOs). We propose a novel disclosure risk metric
based on a leave-one-out intrusion scenario, which is quickly evaluated by our derived CPO estimates. We
propose a model-based utility metric tailored to LGCPs built off the propensity mean square error (pMSE )
explored by Snoke et. al [23] to assess the scientific quality of a synthetic data set. We motivate our work
with Dr. John Snow’s renowned cholera outbreak dataset, which is, notably, one of the only openly available
datasets consisting of individual disease case locations.
In 1854, the small suburb of Soho, London was plagued by a massive cholera outbreak. When a wave of
cholera first hit London in 1831, the scientific community at the time assumed that the disease was spread
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by “miasma in the atmosphere” [25]. Dr. John Snow, an obstetrician, sought to convince the town’s officials
that the epidemic was in fact water borne. To do so, Dr. Snow began by constructing a map of Soho
(see Figure 1). He then went door-to-door collecting, and plotting, each of the 578 reported cholera death
incidences. From this map, Dr. Snow concluded that the Broad St. water pump was the source of the
outbreak. This analysis was used to convince town officials to close the water pump.
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Figure 1: A map of the 578 observed cholera deaths, streets, and water pumps in Soho, London. The Broad St. water pump
(pump 7) was the source of the outbreak.
Access to individual locations of each disease incidence allows for scientific analyses to accurately
capture the geographic trends associated with a disease outbreak. Congress mandated the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) establishing standards for the privacy of individually
identifiable health information [1]. For disease location data, individual identification is equivalent to knowing
one’s individual location. For this reason, agencies are legally obligated to ensure that proper privacy
constraints are met before disseminating individual disease occurrence locations.
One of the most common methods used to privatize disease case locations prior to data dissemination is
radial perturbation [2, 27]. In radial perturbation, each location is randomly perturbed within a radius r of
their true location. It has been argued that radial perturbation poses two problems; 1) If perturbations of
large radius r are required for strong privacy guarantees, the underlying spatial structure is destroyed; 2)
For sparsely populated regions, small perturbations offer weak privacy guarantees [17, 18, 27]. Though the
two stated drawbacks of radial perturbation seem to be agreed upon [17, 27, 19], these points have not been
clearly illustrated by any empirical studies. In this work we demonstrate the fallacies of radial perturbation
by providing the first Bayesian analysis of risk vs. utility of radially perturbed locations.
Disease case locations which have been perturbed to satisfy legal constraints may be of low scientific
quality. An ideal dataset will offer low disclosure risks and provide inference similar to that of the confidential
dataset. Wang and Reiter [27] proposed the use of CART models to generate synthetic locations from
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approximate conditional distributions of each location given the attributes of individuals in the data set.
Since CART models draw locations independently from the response distribution they could produce a
synthetic data set that contains two records that are spatially close in the confidential set but distant in the
synthetic set [27]. Although the CART models can preserve some spatial structure in the confidential data,
they can miss localized spatial dependencies [17]. Quick et al. [17] used LGCPs in place of CART models
to preserve the spatial dependence structure of the confidential set. Quick et al. [17] generated synthetic
locations by simulating from the fitted LGCP model with posterior mean estimates for each parameter in
the model. We propose a synthesis method that adds random spatial noise to the intensity surface of the
LGCP. This method contains the synthesis method of Quick et al. [17] as a special case when the variance of
the random spatial noise is set to zero. We also propose a second synthesis method that includes a resampled
spatial random field in the intensity surface. We show that these novel synthesis methods provide improved
disclosure risks relative to the methods of Quick et al. [17] and radial perturbation.
Synthetic data sets should offer quantifiable disclosure risks for every individual involved in the study.
Quick et al. [17] defined a risk metric for fully-synthetic locations by conditioning on the attributes of each
individual. This metric is not defined for location-only data sets, which are common for disease outbreaks and
are the case we consider in this study. To assess disclosure risks we consider an intrusion scenario in which
an intruder attempts to identify a confidential location within a radius r of the truth given 1) knowledge
of the synthesis method, 2) unique identification of all but one confidential location, and 3) the released
synthetic dataset. In turn, our risk metric requires the evaluation of a leave-one-out posterior predictive
density. Leave-one-out scenarios are commonly used to assess privacy risks and are central to privacy [9, 27].
Obtaining leave-one-out predictive densities is often a computationally burdensome task for high
dimensional data sets and spatial models, as individual model fits are required for every observation in
the data set. CPO estimates rely on independent marginal distributions to estimate the leave-one-out
posterior predictive density for each observation by Monte Carlo approximation using samples from the
posterior density of the full data set [12]. In turn, CPO estimates are easy to obtain when independence is
assumed for each observation. In the existing literature, dependence structures commonly assumed in spatial
models make CPO estimates computationally expensive [12]. In Section 4 we derive CPO estimates for Cox
processes with dependence structures, allowing for fast approximations of posterior predictive leave-one-out
LGCP densities for spatial point process data. This provides a general approach for model selection for
spatial point process data, and in Section 7.1 we demonstrate that each individual disclosure risk can be
easily approximated with CPO estimates using samples from the posterior conditioned on the full data set.
This provides a novel computationally efficient approach to assessing disclosure risks in spatial location data.
Synthetic data sets should satisfy disclosure risk requirements and offer meaningful scientific inference.
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Woo et al. [30] and Snoke et al. [24] developed the propensity mean square error (pMSE ) to assess the
distributional similarity between a synthetic and confidential data set. The pMSE is the mean square error
of the predicted probability that a given observation belongs to the confidential set. A synthetic data set
that is indistinguishable from the confidential set is said to be of high utility. We propose a model-based
utility metric that tailors the pMSE statistic to LGCPs.
In a case study of Dr. John Snow’s cholera outbreak dataset, we demonstrate that both of our
proposed synthesis methods offer datasets with reduced disclosure risks and higher data utility than radial
perturbation. To our knowledge, we offer the first Bayesian analysis of radial perturbation. We also show
that our synthesis methods offer improved disclosure risks relative to the approach of Quick et al. [17]. In
summary, our contributions in this work include
1. Two novel methods for generating synthetic point process data based on log-Gaussian Cox processes
(LGCPs).
2. A derivation of conditional predictive ordinate (CPO) estimates for point process data.
3. A novel metric for evaluating privacy risks based on CPO estimates.
4. An adaptation of the propensity mean square error (pMSE ) [23] data utility metric tailored to point
process data.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the process of generating
and disseminating synthetic locations. In Section 3 we provide background information on the LGCPs models
considered in this work. In Section 4 we demonstrate that the CPO can be readily obtained for any Cox
process. In Section 5–6 we introduce our proposed synthesis methodologies and detail our model based
utility metric. In Section 7 we introduce our novel risk metric and detail how individual disclosure risks are
assessed for each synthesis method using CPO arguments. In Section 8 we illustrate our methodology with
a case study of Dr. John Snow’s cholera dataset. We conclude with a discussion in Section 9.
2. Data Synthesis and Dissemination
In this section we outline the process of generating, evaluating, and disseminating synthetic location-
only data. We begin by fitting the confidential dataset according to a LGCP with intensity surface λ(·) as
detailed in Section 3. The LGCP allows for a model that includes any desired covariates and captures spatial
auto-correlation.
Once the model is fitted, synthetic locations are simulated from a LGCP with intensity λ†(·), determined
from the confidential model fit. The LGCP intensity surface includes a zero-mean Gaussian spatial random
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effect with covariance parameterized by θ = (κ2, τ2). Our first proposed synthesis method re-samples
the spatial random effect from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with covariance determined by plug-in
estimates θˆ = (κˆ2, τˆ2). Our second novel synthesis method involves adding random Gaussian noise to the
posterior mean estimate of the summary statistic λˆ(·) from the confidential set. Synthetic locations are
obtained by sampling from a LGCP with synthetic intensity λ†(·).
Prior to disseminating data, statistical agencies are required to ensure that subjects’ can not be unwillingly
identified [1]. We introduce an individual disclosure risk metric to quantify how much an intruder can learn
about the confidential locations from a synthetic data set. We assess individual disclosure risks by considering
the intrusion scenario in which the intruder has gained knowledge of 1) the synthetic dataset S†, 2) complete
information about the synthesis method, and 3) has uniquely identified all but one confidential location
S/sk. The intruder attempts to identify the final confidential location within a radius r of the truth given
the synthetic dataset and all but one confidential location. The risk is taken to be the max individual
disclosure risk for S/sk given S†, and complete information about the synthesis method. In the Bayesian
framework, we require the posterior distribution of pi
(
λ|S†,S/sk
)
. We demonstrate how to use samples from
the simultaneous fit of all the data pi
(
λ|S†,S) to obtain CPO estimates for the risk of each synthesis method
considered in Section 7.
The goal of this work is to provide approaches to disseminate fully synthetic location-only data that offer
low disclosure risks and provide scientific inference similar to that of the confidential set. Once a synthetic
dataset is generated, we assess the quality (utility) of a synthetic dataset by computing the pMSE statistic
to quantify how well a given synthetic dataset emulates the confidential dataset. We then evaluate the
maximum disclosure risk for our given intrusion scenario. An optimal synthetic dataset will provide a small
maximum disclosure risk, while maintaining high data utility. We repeat the processes of data generation
and risk/utility assessment until an acceptable balance of data utility vs. maximum disclosure risk has been
obtained. A synthetic dataset that satisfies the desired privacy vs. utility trade-off is then released along
with all information related to the synthesis process.
3. LGCPs
In this section we provide a brief background on LGCPs and the computational details associated
with model fitting. A Cox process is a point process governed by a non-negative stochastic process
Λ = {s ∈ R2 : Λ(s)}. Conditioned on the realization Λ(s) = λ(s), the point process is a Poisson process
with intensity λ(s). Cox processes are natural models for point process phenomena that are environmentally
driven, such as the spatial locations of infectious disease cases [5]. In this work, we model locations according
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to a Cox process with a spatially varying intensity surface λ(·). The number of points inside a region Ω ⊂ R2
is distributed N |λ(·) ∼ Pois (∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
)
. The likelihood for a set of locations S = {si}Ni observed in Ω is
given by
pi(S, N |λ(·)) = exp
(
−
∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
) ∏N
i=1 λ(si)
N !
. (1)
Møller et al. introduced the class of LGCPs as a method to describe spatial correlation in point process
models [15]. A LGCP with spatially continuous covariates x(s) and population density offset log (pd(s)) is
a Cox process with intensity λ(s) given by
log(λ(s)) = log(pd(s)) + x′(s)β + η(s), s ∈ R2, (2)
where η(s) is a Gaussian process with mean zero and some user defined covariance function C(·, ·).
3.1. Computational Details for Fitting Log-Gaussian Cox Processes
Fitting LGCPs is a computationally burdensome task for high dimensional data. In this work we elect
to use the approximation technique of Lindgren et al. [13] to express the Gaussian process η(s) as a basis
expansion
η(s) =
n∑
i=1
φi(s)wi, s ∈ Ω, (3)
where n is the number of knots placed in Ω and {φi(s)}ni=1 is a set of piecewise triangular basis functions
(see Appendix A.1 for details). Lindgren et al. [13] showed that the weights of the basis expansion in (3)
are distributed
w|κ2, ξ2 ∼ N(0, ξ2Q−1κ2 ), (4)
where Q−1κ2 is a sparse precision matrix. The distribution in (4) is an approximation to a zero-mean Gaussian
process with Mate´rn covariance function
C(u,v) = ξ2(κ||v − u||)K1(κ||v − u||), v,u ∈ R2, (5)
where || · || denotes Euclidean distance, and K1(·) is an order one Bessel function of the second kind. The
marginal variance is given by σ2 = ξ2/
(
4piκ2
)
, while the approximation of the effective range is given by
ρ =
√
8/κ [13]. We refer the reader to Appendix (A.1–A.2) for further details regarding model fitting.
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4. Conditional Predictive Ordinate Estimates for Cox Processes
Geisser [11] first introduced the leave-one-out predictive distribution pi
(
yi|y−i
)
, known as the conditional
predictive ordinate (CPO), as a diagnostic to detect inconsistent observations from a given model. CPO
estimates are commonly used to perform Bayesian model selection for independently distributed error
responses, as only one model fit is required to obtain each leave-one-out-predictive density [16, 12]. CPO
estimates are obtained by Monte Carlo approximation, using samples from the posterior distribution
conditioned on the full data set [12]. In this section we demonstrate that CPO estimates can easily be
obtained for Cox processes with dependence structures.
The leave-one-out predictive distribution for each location in a given dataset is
CPOk = pi(sk, N |S−k) =
∫
pi(sk, N |λ,S−k)pi(λ|S−k)dλ. (6)
The quantity in (6), also known as the conditional predictive ordinate (CPO) [11], represents the density
of sk when a model is fit without sk. CPO estimates are constructed by utilizing independent marginal
distributions to rewrite the likelihood without observation k, pi(S−k|λ,N), as a scaled factor of the full
likelihood pi(S|λ,N). When sk is independent of S−k (i.e. independence), samples from the full posterior
pi(λ|N,S) can be used to easily obtain CPO estimates via Monte Carlo approximation of (6). The statistic
−2∑Ni=1 CPOi is commonly used to perform Bayesian model selection in a fashion similar to leave-one-out
cross-validation [12].
Dependence structures commonly assumed in spatial models are generally computationally expensive,
and so CPOs are rarely used for spatial data. Here, we demonstrate that CPO estimates can easily be
obtained for Cox processes with spatial dependence structures. The key reason this is possible is that, for
a LGCP, the likelihood of each location is independent of all other locations conditioned on the intensity
surface λ(·), which contains the dependence structure. In Section 7, we define a risk metric based on a leave-
one-out intrusion scenario. The CPO estimates derived in this section allow us to quickly obtain disclosure
risk estimates by avoiding the computationally burdensome task of leave-one-out model fitting.
Assume that the points, S = {si}Ni=1, follow a Cox Process with intensity λ(·). CPOk is given by
CPOk = pi(sk, N |S−k) =
(
Epi(λ|S,N)
[∫
Ω
λ(s)
λ(sk)
])−1
. (7)
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To see this, we first note that we can express the likelihood pi(S−k, N |λ) as
pi(S−k, N |λ) =
∫
Ω
∏N
i=1 λ(si)
N ! exp
(∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
)dsk
=
(∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
) (∏
i 6=k λ(si)
)
N ! exp
(∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
)
=
λ(sk)∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
pi(S, N |θ). (8)
Using (8), we obtain the CPO as follows
CPOk = pi(sk, N |S−k) =
(
pi(S−k, N)
pi(S, N)
)−1
=
(∫
pi(S−k, N |λ)
pi(S, N) pi(λ)dλ
)−1
=
(∫ (∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
λ(sk)
)
pi(S, N |λ)
pi(S, N) pi(λ)dλ
)−1
=
(∫ (∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
λ(sk)
)
pi(λ|S, N)dλ
)−1
=
(
Epi(λ|S,N)
[(∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
λ(sk)
)])−1
.
We have shown that the CPO can easily be expressed in terms of expectation with respect to the posterior
conditioned on the full data set pi(λ|S, N) for any Cox process. Thus CPO estimates are easily be obtained
by a Monte Carlo approximation for spatial point process data generated by LGCPs! To see this, let λ(m)
represent the mth sample drawn from pi(λ|S, N). CPO estimates are obtained by
CPOk = pi(sk, N |S−k) ≈
(
M∑
m=1
∫
Ω
λ(m)(s)ds
λ(m)(sk)
)−1
, (9)
where M in (9) represents the total number of samples drawn from pi(λ|S, N). In Section 7, we demonstrate
that individual disclosure risks can be easily evaluated by CPO estimates.
5. Generating Fully Synthetic Location Data
In this section we detail our proposed Bayesian methods for generating fully synthetic location data based
on LGCPs. We also formally introduce radial synthesis as a baseline comparison for our proposed synthesis
methods.
8
5.1. Radial Synthesis
Randomly perturbing locations within a radius r of their true location is one of the most common
redaction methods [26]. It has been claimed that when large perturbations are required to ensure adequate
privacy protection, inference related to spatial dependence structures are diminished [2, 17, 27]. Intuitively
this claim seems reasonable, as large perturbations will destroy localized spatial clusters. Due to its popularity
and simplicity, we treat radial perturbation as the baseline synthesis method for comparison. To our
knowledge, no Bayesian analyses have been performed to assess the utility and disclosure risks associated
with radial perturbation. We perform radial synthesis by drawing N independent synthetic locations from
circular uniform distributions with radius r centered at each si, denoted s
†
i ∼ U(si, r).
5.2. Additive Noise Synthesis
Here, we introduce our first proposed synthesis method, Additive Noise Synthesis (ANS ). In ANS, we
alter the global variance parameter of the spatial random field η(s) contained within the intensity surface
λ(s). We perform ANS by adding a noisy spatial random field ν(s) with the same spatial scale to the log-
intensity surface. ANS proceeds as follows. We first fit an LGCP to the confidential set S = {si}Ni according
to Section 3. We then obtain posterior mean estimates for the basis expansion weights wˆ = Epi(w,β|S)[w],
fixed effects βˆ = Epi(w,β|S)[β], and spatial scale parameter κˆ2 = Epi(κ2,ξ2|S)[κ2].
Next, we simulate a Gaussian noise process v ∼ N(0, σ2Q−1κ̂2 ) with precision matrix Q−1κ2 (defined in
Appendix A.1) for some user-defined noise level σ2. Following Section 3.1, we express the additive noise as
a basis expansion ν(s) =
∑n
i=1 φi(s)vi. We obtain the resulting ANS intensity surface
λ†(s) = exp
(
log(pd(s)) + x′(s)βˆ +
n∑
i=1
φi(s) (wˆi + vi)
)
. (10)
Note that w and v are both mean zero normally distributed random vectors with covariance structures given
by ξ2Q−1κ2 and σ
2Q−1κ2 and thus, w+ v ∼ N(0, (ξ2 + σ2)Q−1κ2 ). Intuitively, the addition of Gaussian random
noise in the intensity surface will randomly scale the relative risk of disease occurrence at each location s.
To see this note that (10) can equivalently be expressed as λ†(s) = exp (ν(s)) λˆ(s), where λˆ(s) denotes the
intensity surface with plug-in posterior mean estimates βˆ and wˆ. We also note that ANS can be viewed
as an extension of the synthesis method proposed by Quick et al. [17], in which synthetic locations were
generated based on posterior mean plug-in estimates. To see this, we simply take the noise-level to be zero
(σ2 = 0).
We generate synthetic locations by uniformly sampling N∗ points with N∗ >> N over the spatial
domain Ω. We then assign each of the N∗ sampled locations {s∗i }N
∗
i=1 probability weights pˆ
∗
k =
λ†(s∗k)∑N∗
j=1 λ
†(s∗j )
.
9
We obtain an ANS synthetic dataset by sampling N of the N∗ locations without replacement according to
their probabilities pˆ∗k.
Figure 2: (A): An intensity surface plot with the posterior mean estimate for the spatial random field ηˆ(s) from the John Snow
cholera outbreak dataset. (B): An ANS intensity surface plot for an additive noise spatial random field, ψ(s), with spatial scale
κˆ2 and noise-level σ2 = 10.
In ANS, we alter the marginal variance of the spatial random effect by some user defined noise level σ2.
Therefore, an ANS data set produces an intensity surface with the same spatial scale as the confidential data
set with larger variability (see Figure 2). In turn, we expect ANS data sets to offer an inverse relationship
between disclosure risks and data utility relative to the user defined noise level. That is, an ANS data set
with a large user defined noise level will offer lower disclosure risks and lower data utility relative to a data
set with a smaller noise level.
5.3. Posterior Resampling Synthesis
Here, we propose another novel synthesis method which we call Posterior Resampling Synthesis (PRS ).
Gaussian processes with Mate´rn covariance given by (5) are fully characterized by variance parameter ξ2 and
spatial scale parameter κ2. For fixed values of ξ2 and κ2, realizations of the spatial random field η(s) will
produce random fields with the same marginal variance and spatial range. Intuitively, a resampled spatial
random field will relocate spatial clusters while preserving the dependence structure of the confidential
intensity surface (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: (A): An intensity surface plot with the posterior mean estimate for the spatial random field ηˆ(s) from the John Snow
cholera outbreak dataset. (B): An intensity surface plot for a resampled spatial random field, ν(s), with spatial scale κˆ2 and
variance parameter ξˆ2.
The posterior resampling synthesis (PRS ) process is described as follows. Similar to ANS, we first fit
the confidential dataset according to a LGCP as described in Section 3.1 via MCMC. We then compute
posterior mean estimates for the fixed effects, βˆ = Epi(β,w|S)[β], spatial scale, κˆ2 = Epi(ξ2,κ2|S)[κ2], and
variance parameter, ξˆ2 = Epi(ξ2,κ2|S)[ξ2] from the confidential fit. We generate a new spatial random field
based on the posterior mean of the hyperparameters, w∗ ∼ N(0, ξˆ2Q−1κˆ2 ). We obtain the PRS intensity
surface by swapping the basis expansion weights w for the resampled weights w∗,
λ†(s) = exp
(
log(pd(s)) + x′(s)β +
n∑
i=1
φi(s)w
∗
i
)
. (11)
We then simulate a PRS dataset by sampling N locations from a LGCP with intensity (11) as described in
Section 5.2.
The spatial scale and marginal variance of a PRS intensity surface are given by posterior mean estimates
from the confidential data set. In turn, PRS generated data sets maintain data utility by preserving the
correlative structure of the confidential set, and reduce disclosure risks by relocating spatial clusters contained
in the intensity surface.
6. Evaluating Utility
In Sections (5.1–5.3) we presented radial synthesis and our two proposed methods for generating fully
synthetic location data. Our goal is to disseminate synthetic locations that reduce disclosure risks, while
allowing for meaningful analyses to be conducted by secondary analysts. The propensity mean square error
(pMSE ) developed by Woo et al. [30] and Snoke et al. [24] is the mean square error of the predicted
probability that a given observation belongs to the confidential set. The pMSE is a metric for measuring
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the distributional similarity between a synthetic and confidential data set [23]. In this section, we provide a
model-based estimation of the predicted probabilities required to estimate the pMSE for LGCPs.
Let λ(s) and λ†(s) denote the intensity surfaces for the true dataset, S, and synthetic dataset,
S†, respectively. Let {yk}2Nk=1 denote the collection of true and synthetic locations S ∪ S†. Assuming
P (yk ∈ S) = 0.5, the probability a point yk belongs to the true dataset is
pk = P (yk ∈ S|λ, λ†) =
λ(yk)
λ(yk) +
( ∫
Ω
λ(s)ds∫
Ω
λ(†)(s)ds
)
λ†(yk)
. (12)
The probability of correct classification for each point in S ∪ S† can be approximated by Monte Carlo
simulation. To do so, L samples are drawn from the intensity surface of the true posterior λ(l) ∼ pi(λ|S) and
the synthetic posterior λ†(l) ∼ pi(λ†|S†) respectively. Define
p
(l)
k = P (yk ∈ S|λ(l), λ†
(l)
) =
λ(l)(yk)
λ(l)(yk) +
( ∫
Ω
λ(l)(s)ds∫
Ω
λ†(l)(s)ds
)
λ†(l)(yk)
. (13)
The probability of correctly identifying yk is
pˆk = E[P (yk is classified correctly)] ≈
1
L
L∑
l=1
(p
(l)
k )
xk(1− p(l)k )1−xk , (14)
where
xk =

0, yk ∈ S†
1, yk ∈ S
.
The predicted probabilities given in (14) are used to to approximate the pMSE,
pMSE ≈ p̂MSE = 1
2N
2N∑
k=1
(pˆk − 0.5)2. (15)
We elect to use the pMSE to quantify the quality of a given synthetic data set due to its intuitive
interpretation. A synthetic dataset, S†, that is indistinguishable from the confidential set, S, produces
a pMSE score of 0. A synthetic dataset that is systematically distinguishable from the confidential set will
offer little scientific inference. Such sets are assigned a worst case pMSE score of 0.25.
In this section, we have demonstrated how the pMSE can be tailored to LGCPs. In Section 8, we use
the pMSE to assess the quality of synthetic cholera death locations.
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7. Evaluating Disclosure Risks
In this section we construct a novel risk metric to quantify individual disclosure risks in spatial location
data. We provide the computational details required to obtain individual disclosure risk estimates for
each proposed synthesis method. We also discuss the restrictive a priori assumptions required to obtain
differentially private intensity surfaces λ(·).
7.1. Disclosure Risk Metric
Let S = {si}Ni=1 be the collection of the N confidential locations and S† = {s†i}Ni=1 the collection of N
synthetic locations. Assume an adversary has access to the synthetic dataset, knowledge of the synthesis
method, population density, and has identified all but the kth confidential location sk. The intruder aims to
identify the final kth confidential location within a ball of radius r of the truth, denoted Br(sk). We consider
this high risk scenario, as it quantifies how much information a synthetic set offers to an intruder who has
identified all but one true location. This is a common scenario in privacy, including empirical differential
privacy [4, 27]. The metric also holds an intuitive interpretation; if a region Br(sk) is of high probability
then the synthetic data set provides an intruder with information useful for locating a confidential location.
The probability of identifying person k within a radius r of the true location given the synthetic dataset
and all but the kth true location is
P ({s ∈ Br(sk) ∩ Ω}|S−k,S†) =
∫
Br(sk)
pi
(
s|S−k,S†
)
ds. (16)
Notice that (16) is an integral over a leave-one-out-density pi
(
s|S−k,S†
)
. We rely on the CPO estimates
detailed in Section 4 along with a quadrature scheme (detailed in Appendix A.4) to evaluate (16). The
computational details required for evaluating the CPOs, pi
(
s|S−k,S†
)
, of each synthesis method are described
in the following sections.
7.2. Radial Synthesis Disclosure Risks
To fit a LGCP to a radially perturbed synthetic data set and the confidential set simultaneously, we
assume a circular uniform prior for the synthetic data, s†i ∼ U(si, r) for i = 1, 2, ..., N , and a LGCP with
intensity λ(·) for the confidential set S. We require an estimate of the CPO pi(s|S−k,S†) to evaluate the
risk metric in (16). Evaluation of the leave-one-out density pi
(
s|S−k,S†
)
requires samples from the posterior
distribution pi
(
λ|S−k,S†
)
for each location sk. We also require a linkage prior to determine which synthetic
location s†i was uniquely generated from each confidential location si.
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Fortunately we can overcome this computational bottleneck by augmenting the CPO argument presented
in Section 4. The leave-one-out predictive density for data generated by radial synthesis is given by
pi
(
s, N |S−k,S†
)
=
[
Epi(λ|S)
[∫
Br(s†k) λ(s)ds
λ(s)
]]−1
. (17)
Notice that the CPO estimate in (17) only requires samples from the marginal distribution of the confidential
dataset pi(λ|S). In turn, we do not require samples drawn from the leave-one-out posterior density
pi
(
λ|S−k,S†
)
. We also avoid the computationally burdensome task of forming a linkage prior between
the confidential and synthetic locations. A full derivation of (17) is included in Appendix A.3.
We estimate the CPO in (17) by Monte Carlo integration. Let L represent the number of samples drawn
from the marginal density pi(λ|S). The expectation in (17) is estimated by
pi
(
s, N |S−k,S†
) ≈ [ 1
L
L∑
l=1
∫
Br(s†k) λ
(l)(s)ds
λ(l)(s)
]−1
. (18)
Note that the integral
∫
Br(s†k) λ
(l)(s)ds in (18) must be evaluated for all L samples. We approximate the
analytically intractable integral with the quadrature scheme detailed in Appendix A.4.
7.3. Additive Noise Synthesis Disclosure Risks
CPO estimates of pi
(
s|S−k,S†
)
for ANS generated sets require samples from the joint distribution
pi
(
λ, λ†|S,S†). We use a Metropolis Hastings sampler to draw samples from the desired joint marginal
density. The simultaneous fit assumes that the synthetic data is independent of the confidential data, that
is pi
(S,S†|λ, λ†) = pi(S|λ)pi(S†|λ†), where pi(S|λ) ∼ LGCP (λ(·)) and pi(S†|λ†) ∼ LGCP (λ†(·)). The
intensity surfaces are of the form
log (λ(s)) = x′(s)β +
n∑
i=1
φi(s)wi + log (pd (s)) (19)
log
(
λ†(s)
)
= x′(s)β +
n∑
i=1
φi(s)(wi + vi) + log (pd (s)), (20)
where the basis expansion weights in (19) and (20) are independently distributed pi
(
w|ξ2, κ2) ∼ N(0, ξ2Q−1κ2 )
and pi
(
v|σ2, κ2) ∼ N(0, σ2Q−1κ2 ). Recall that σ2 is the noise level, released to the public along with the
synthetic dataset. For this reason σ2 is treated as known and fixed at its true value.
Let λ(l)(·) denote the lth draw from pi(λ, λ†|S,S†). A Monte Carlo estimate of the CPO, pi(s|S−k,S†),
14
is given by
pi
(
s, N |S−k,S†
)
=
[
Epi(λ,λ†|S,S†)
[∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
λ(s)
]]−1
≈
[
1
L
L∑
l=1
∫
Ω
λ(l)(s)ds
λ(l)(s)
]−1
. (21)
The integral
∫
Ω
λ(l)(s)ds in (21) is numerically approximated for all L samples following Simpson et al. [22]
(see (30) of Appendix A.2 for details). The individual disclosure risk in (16) for location sk is obtained by
using a quadrature scheme (see Appendix A.4) to integrate the CPO over Br(sk).
7.4. Posterior Resampling Synthesis Disclosure Risks
Similar to ANS, CPO estimates for PRS require samples from the joint marginal pi
(
λ|S,S†). As
done with ANS, we again assume that the synthetic data is independent of the confidential set, that is
pi
(
λ, λ†|S,S†) = pi(λ|S)pi(λ†|S†). Recall that the synthetic intensity surface is given by log (λ†(s)) =
x′(s)β +
∑n
i=1 φi(s)w
∗
i + log (pd(s)), where w
∗ ∼ N(0, ξˆ2Q−1κˆ2 ).
A Metropolis Hastings sampler is used to obtain samples from the joint distribution by sequentially
drawing from the posterior distributions pi
(
β|S,S†,w,w∗), pi(w|S,β, κ2, ξ2), pi(w∗|S†,β, κ2, ξ2) and
pi
(
ξ2, κ2|w,w∗). CPO estimates are obtained by evaluating (21) using samples from the joint distribution.
PRS disclosure risks are then obtained by following the quadrature and Monte Carlo scheme as detailed in
Section 7.3.
7.5. Differential Privacy
Dwork et al. [8] and Dwork [7] introduced differential privacy (DP) a measure of confidentiality protection.
DP protects the information of every individual in the data set by limiting the influence that any one
respondent can have on the released information. DP ensures the confidentiality of each individual in a
database, even against an adversary who has gained complete knowledge of the rest of the data set.
Formally, a randomized algorithm M(S) is said to be -differentially private if
P (M(S) ∈ A) ≤ exp ()P (M(S∗) ∈ A), (22)
for all measurable subsets A of the range of M and for all datasets S,S∗ differing by one entry [9].
Dimitrakakis at al. [6] and Foulds et al. [10] observed that Bayesian posterior sampling provides -
differential privacy under certain prior assumptions. Theorem 2 of Foulds et al. [10] states that releasing
one sample from the posterior distribution, pi(x|θ), with any prior, pi(θ), is 2C-differentially private provided
supx,x′∈X ,θ∈Θ| log (pi(x|θ))| ≤ C. We describe this result for LGCPs.
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Consider the collection of N locations in Ω ⊂ R2 denoted X . Let S,S∗ ∈ X differ by at most one entry,
say s and s∗. Assume we model the locations according to a LGCP with intensity λ(·) given by (2) with a
spatial random field defined as in (4). As shown in Foulds et al. [10], releasing one sample from the posterior
distribution pi(λ|S) is 2C-differentially private for any prior, provided
maxS,S′∈X ,λ∈Λ| log pi(s∗|λ)− log pi(s|λ)| ≤ C. (23)
For LGCPs, (23) holds provided ∀s, s∗ ∈ Ω,
supλ∈Λ| log λ(s∗)− log λ(s)| ≤ C. (24)
Equivalently, the left hand side of (24) can be expressed as
supλ∈Λ
∣∣∣∣∣(x′ (s∗)− x′(s))β +
n∑
i=1
(φi(s
∗)− φi(s))wi + log (pd (s∗))− log (pd(s))
∣∣∣∣∣ . (25)
It is clear from (25) that the privacy “cost” C in (24) is determined by bounding the maximum distance
between any continuous covariate measured on Ω and the magnitude of each fixed effect βi and spatial weight
wi. An a priori constraint on the parameter space of both the fixed effects and spatial random effects is
required to produce a desired privacy cost C. Scientists rarely posses enough a priori knowledge to suggest
a simultaneous clipping of the fixed effects and spatial random effect. For this reason, we have elected to
move away from differential privacy, and instead utilize the disclosure risk metric introduced in Section 7.1.
8. Case Study: Dr. John Snow’s Cholera Outbreak
We now apply our proposed methodology to Dr. John Snow’s cholera outbreak. The data set consists
of N = 578 observed cholera death locations. We fit the locations according to a LGCP with intensity
λ(s) as in (2) with the region of Soho, London represented by Ω = [200 m, 2, 200 m]2. A priori, we assume
β ∼ N(0, 2I), where β consists of an intercept β0 and the distance to the Broad St. water pump (the source
of the outbreak) β1. The estimated population kernel density estimate (see Figure 4) log (pd(s)) serves as
the offset. The prior choices for the variance and spatial scale (κ, ξ) of the spatial random field are detailed
in Appendix A.5.
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Figure 4: A kernel density estimate of the Soho, London population in 1854. Cholera death locations are plotted in blue as well
as the water pumps numbered 1-13, with pump 7 being the Broad St. water pump. The estimated total population is 21,345.
We fit the LGCP model via MCMC following the technique described in Appendix A.2. We tune our
Metropolis-Hastings sampler according to the adaptive tuning scheme of Roberts and Rosenthal [21] for
250,000 burn-in samples. Another 250,000 post burn-in samples are stored for inference. The resulting
parameter estimates, including the fixed effects, effective range, and marginal variance of the spatial random
field are summarized in Table 1. We note that βˆ1 = −0.946 suggests that the further an individual lives
from the Broad St. pump, the less susceptible they are to cholera death.
Using the fitted model, we generate 15 synthetic datasets via PRS following Section 5.3. Additionally,
20 ANS datasets are generated with noise levels σ2 = 0.5, 1, 1.5, ..., 9.5, 10 following Section 5.2. 10 synthetic
sets via radial synthesis with radii r = 50 m, 100 m, ... , 300 m as detailed in Section 5.1. Metropolis-
Hastings samplers are used to assess utility and disclosure risks following Sections 6 and 7. Each sampler
drew 500,000 samples, with 250,000 discarded as burn-in. The results are summarized in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Plot of max disclosure risk vs. pMSE for ANS, radial synthesis, and PRS datasets. Note that only the min and max
utility are plotted for PRS.
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Figure 6: Plot of max disclosure risk vs. pMSE for ANS and PRS datasets with max disclosure risks all less than 0.005. The
noise level σ2 is displayed above each ANS point. All 15 PRS data sets are plotted.
From Figure 5 it is clear that synthetic sets generated according to PRS offer the lowest max disclosure
risks. In Figure 5, we only plot the max and min utility scores for PRS, as the max disclosure risk for
all considered PRS datasets was 6.28e-10. Figure 5 clearly shows that max disclosure risks for data sets
generated from radial synthesis are consistently larger than ANS and PRS datasets. In Figure 6, we see
that ANS data sets with small noise levels offer an improvement in data utility with an increase in max
disclosure risk in comparison to PRS. For large noise values, the ANS datasets offer small reductions in max
disclosure risk at the expense of data utility.
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The goal of this work is to generate a synthetic data set that offers low disclosure risks while preserving
scientific inference. Since the max disclosure risk for the 15 considered PRS data sets were all less than
6.28e-10, we suggest releasing the PRS data set that offers the highest data utility with a pMSE score of
0.0016. Recall that a small pMSE score corresponds to higher data utility. The synthetic intensity surface,
synthetic locations, and confidential locations are plotted in Figure 7. In Table 1, we see that the PRS fixed
effect estimates, effective range, and marginal variance are similar to the confidential set (see Table 1). In
turn, Dr. Snow could still have determined the source of the cholera outbreak from the PRS data set.
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Figure 7: A plot of the fitted intensity surface for the optimal PRS data set with max disclosure risk of 1.205e-17 and pMSE
score of 0.0016. The true deaths (blue), PRS synthetic locations (red), and the Broad St. pump (black) are plotted as well.
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Parameter Posterior Mean Est. 95% Credible Interval PRS Posterior Mean Est. PRS 95% Credible Interval
β0 -0.771 (-1.928, 0.387) -0.799 (-1.867, 0.431)
β1 -0.946 (-1.183,-0.729) -0.829 (-1.046, -0.642)
ρ 3.487 (2.027, 8.065) 6.506 (3.831, 9.177)
τ 0.725 (0.241, 2.577) 0.554 (0.269,1.143)
Table 1: Posterior mean estimates and corresponding 95% credible intervals for the effective range and marginal variance of
the spatial random field for the confidential and PRS data sets.
The goal of this work was to produce a synthetic data set reduces individual disclosure risks while
preserving data utility. In this case study, we observed that even for large radial perturbations (300 m),
we could always find a noise level for ANS which offers improved data utility and reduced disclosure risks.
Similarly, PRS datasets always offer reduced disclosure risks and improved data utility in comparison to
radial synthesis. In summary, both of our proposed synthesis methods out perform radial perturbation in
terms of risk vs. utility. Since the PRS data sets considered offered lower max disclosure risks than any of
the radial perturbation or ANS data sets, we suggested the dissemination of the PRS data set that offered
the highest data utility. We then showed that the chosen PRS data set offered inference similar to the
confidential data set.
9. Discussion
In this work we proposed two novel Bayesian approaches for generating fully-synthetic location-only
datasets. We introduced a novel risk metric for a high intrusion scenario. We demonstrated that
CPO estimates can easily be obtained for spatial location data generated from LGCPs, and allow for
computationally efficient approximations of individual disclosure risks for each synthesis method. We adapted
the pMSE statistic for spatial point process data generated from LGCPs to evaluate data utility. We
performed a case study of Dr. John Snow’s cholera outbreak data set; showing that PRS and ANS offer an
improved risk to utility ratio in comparison to radial perturbation.
In this work, we have conducted a Bayesian analysis of risk vs. utility for radial synthesis. Among other
common methods used to privatize disease case locations prior to data dissemination are data aggregation
and suppression [2, 27]. Spatial aggregations attempt to reduce disclosure risks by coarsening the geographic
scale; e.g., reporting disease incidences at the county scale. However, any coarsening of the geographic scale
diminishes the level at which a spatial analysis can be performed, and localized geographic trends/hazards can
easily be missed [2]. Data suppression attempts to reduce disclosure risks by removing high risk individuals,
such as spatial outliers, from a dataset. If many individuals are deemed high risk, many locations may
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need to be suppressed, limiting the quality of any spatial analysis. In this work, we chose to focus on
generating spatial location data sets that contained the exact number of observations as the confidential set.
Radial perturbation produces data sets consisting of point referenced disease cases with the same amount of
observations as the original data set. For this reason, aggregation and suppression were not considered.
In this work, we considered an intrusion scenario in which an intruder attempts to identify a confidential
location within a radius r of the truth given 1) the synthetic dataset, 2) knowledge of the synthesis method,
and 3) identification of all but the last confidential location. Quick et al. [17] considered a disclosure risk
metric that defines an individual to be at high risk if they are spatially close to other individuals with similar
attributes. Clearly this metric is not suited to handle location-only data. Wang and Reiter [27] consider
an intrusion case similar to ours. Their risk metric first computes the expected euclidean distance between
an intruder’s guess of the confidential geography with respect to pi
(
sk|S−k,S†
)
, denoted R1. The number
of actual cases within a radius of R1 of the truth are then counted as a measure of reasonable guesses for
the confidential location. Our disclosure risk metric computes the probability that an individual is uniquely
identified within a pre-specified radius r of the truth. Our metric also contains population density as an
offset, allowing the metric to account for different risk levels in regions of dense and sparse populations.
We proposed a utility metric based on the pMSE statistic. Previous work by Quick et al. [17] assessed
data utility with the K-function. The K function is a measure of spatial dependence that computes the
expected number of events within a radius h for each observation in the data set [3, 20]. An ANS generated
data set will have a dependence structure with similar spatial scale and marginal variance that differs from
the confidential set by some user defined noise level. PRS data sets have the same spatial scale and marginal
variance as the confidential set. Both of our proposed synthesis methods produce data sets with correlative
structures similar to the confidential data set. In turn, they will likely produce similar K-function estimates.
The pMSE is a data-based utility metric that determines the utility of a synthetic data set based on how
well a synthetic set emulates the true data set. We tailored the predicted probabilities used to classify
conditional data in the pMSE to LGCPs. In turn our metric accounts for the spatial dependence structure
of the synthetic data set as well. We elected to use the pMSE due to its intuitive interpretation; as the pMSE
can be viewed as the mean square misclassification score between synthetic and confidential locations.
In summary we have developed two novel methods for generating fully-synthetic location-only data. We
demonstrated that CPOs are easily obtainable for spatial point process data generated by LGCPs. We
proposed a disclosure risk metric and model based data utility metric suited for synthetic location data with
no attributes that could easily be evaluated with CPO estimates. We showed that our proposed methodology
outperforms the common approach of radial synthesis in a case study of Dr. John Snow’s cholera outbreak
dataset. We illustrated that PRS offers small max disclosure risk while preserving data utility. Our second
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proposed synthesis method ANS was shown to offer the best utility for small noise levels. For this reason we
believe both of our proposed synthesis methods should be used with the goal of balancing the risk vs data
utility trade off.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Finite Element Approximations for Mate´rn GRFs
Stationary Mate´rn random fields arise as stationary solutions to the stochastic partial differential equation
(
κ2 −4) η(s) = ξW(s), s ∈ R2, (26)
where 4 = ∑2i=1 ∂2∂s2i is the Laplacian operator in 2-dimensions, κ > 0 is a spatial scale parameter, τ > 0
is a variance parameter, and W(s) is Gaussian white noise. Whittle showed that solutions to 26 are GRF
with Mate´rn covariance given by
C(u,v) = ξ2(κ||v − u||)K1(κ||v − u||), v,u ∈ R2, (27)
where || · || denotes Euclidean distance, and K1(·) is an order one Bessel function of the second kind [28, 29].
The marginal variance is given by σ2 = ξ2/
(
4piκ2
)
. The approximation of the effective range is given by
ρ =
√
8/κ [13].
Though the analytic solution provides useful insights, model fitting and parameter estimation are often
facilitated by considering a numerical approximation. Lindgren et al. [13] proposed the use of a finite element
approximation to the stochastic weak formulation of the SPDE (κ2 −4)α/2η(ψ) = ξW(ψ), where {ψ} is a
set of test functions. The finite element method (FEM) solution begins by expressing the solution, η(u), as
a basis expansion
η(s) =
n∑
i=1
φi(s)wi, s ∈ Ω, (28)
where {φi(s)}ni=1 is a set of basis functions on Ω. The solution is only required to hold for a finite collection
of ψi. The Galerkin method approximate solution is obtained by setting {ψi}ni=1 = {φi}ni=1.
Lindgren et al. [13] formulated an FEM approximation by considering {φi(s)}ni=1 to be piecewise
triangular basis functions. The basis functions are constructed by partitioning the spatial region of interest,
Ω ⊂ Rd, into non-overlapping triangular regions. The corners of the triangles, referred to as vertices, are
assigned n Gaussian weights, denoted wi. Each φi is defined to be 1 at vertex i and 0 at all other vertices.
Lindgren et al. [13] derived the distribution of the weights
w|ξ, κ ∼ N (0, ξ2Q−1κ2 ) , (29)
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where Q−1κ2 = L
−1CL−1, with L = κ2C +G. The matrices used to define L are given by Cij =
∫
Ω
φi(s)ds,
and Gij =
∫
Ω
∇φi(s)∇φj(s)ds. Under lattice refinement, the FEM solution converges to the true solution
(see Appendix C.5 of Lindgren et al. [13]).
A.2. Approximate Inference for LGCPs
The stochastic integral,
∫
Ω
λ(s)ds, in the likelihood of (1) cannot be computed analytically. Numerical
integration schemes are used to approximate Cox process likelihoods. A common approach is to grid up the
spatial domain into rectangular regions and evaluate the integral as a weighted sum [5]. Approximations are
improved by refining the lattice into rectangles of smaller area. This becomes computationally burdensome,
as rectangular lattice refinements often produce a mesh with fine partitions in regions containing few
observations.
A desirable mesh possess a finer partition in regions with many observations, and a sparse partition in
regions of few observations; a feature difficult to obtain for regularly spaced lattices. Simpson et al. [22]
proposed the use of a second order approximate dual-cell mesh, known as the Voronoi mesh, by joining the
triangular elements required for fitting the Gaussian process described in Appendix A.1 at their centroids.
The integral can now be approximated by
∫
Ω
λ(s)ds ≈
n∑
i=1
α˜i exp(log(o(s˜i)) + x
′(s˜i)β +
n∑
j=1
φj(s˜i)), (30)
where {s˜i}ni are mesh nodes corresponding to the FEM mesh, and α˜i is the volume of the ith dual cell
produced by the Voronoi mesh.
To construct the approximate likelihood first define the projection matrix Pij = φj(si), and let
the spatially continuous covariates at the observed locations and mesh nodes be denoted by X =
[1Nx1,x(s1)...x(sN )], and X˜ = [1nx1, x˜(s1)...x˜(sn)] respectively. We then define log(η) = (w
′ +
βX ′,w′P ′ + β′X˜), α = (α˜,0′Nx1), and y = (0
′
Nx1,1
′
nx1). The approximate log-likelihood is given by
log(S, N |λ) =
N+n∑
i=1
yi log(ηi)− αiηi. (31)
We note that (31) now resembles the sum of N + n independent Poisson random variables with rate yiαi.
Model fitting can now be performed similarly to Poisson spatial generalized linear mixed models.
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A.3. Circular Synthesis Disclosure Risk Details
Here we derive the CPO estimate used to evaluate disclosure risks for radial synthesis given in (17) of
Section 7.2. First note that the joint likelihood can be written as follows,
pi
(S,S†) = pi(S†|S)pi(S) = ( 1
pir2
)N ( N∏
k=1
I{||sk−s||<r}(s
†
k)
)
pi(S). (32)
Observe that the conditional density for S−k and S given λ is proportional to pi
(S†,S|λ).
pi
(S−k,S†|λ) = ∫
Ω
pi
(S†|S)pi(S|λ)dsk
=
(
1
pir2
)N ∏
i 6=k λ(si)
N ! exp
(∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
) ∫
Ω
I{||sk−s||<r}(s
†
k)λ(sk)dsk
=
(
1
pir2
)N ∏
i 6=k λ(si)
N ! exp
(∫
Ω
λ(s)ds
) ∫
Br(s†k)
λ(s)ds
=
(
λ(sk)∫
Br(s†k) λ(s)ds
)
pi
(S,S†|λ). (33)
We use (32) and (33) to obtain the CPO estimate
pi
(
sk|S−k,S†
)
=
[
pi
(S−k,S†)
(S,S†)
]−1
=
[∫
pi
(S−k,S†|λ)pi(λ)dλ
pi(S,S†)
]−1
=

∫ ( ∫Br(s†k) λ(s)ds
λ(sk)
)
pi
(S,S†|λ)pi(λ)dλ
pi(S,S†)

−1
=

∫ ( ∫Br(s†k) λ(s)ds
λ(sk)
)
pi
(S†|S)pi(S|λ)pi(λ)dλ
pi(S†|S)pi(S)

−1
=
[∫ (∫
Br(s†k) λ(s)ds
λ(sk)
)
pi(λ|S)dλ
]−1
=
[
Epi(λ|S)
[(∫
Br(s†k) λ(s)ds
λ(sk)
)]]−1
. (34)
A.4. Quadrature Scheme For Circular Domains
Here we detail the quadrature scheme for numerical integration a over circular domain used to obtain
disclosure risk estimates in Section 7. Let sk = (xk, yk) represent a location such that xk, yk > 0. We wish
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to integrate
∫
Br(sk)
λ(x, y)dxdy =
∫ r
−r
∫ xk+g(y)
xk−g(y)
λ(x, y)dxdy (35)
where g(y) =
√
(r2 − (y − yk)2). Making the change of variables y˜ = (y−yk)r and x˜ = (x−xk)g(ry˜+yk) , the integral
in (35) becomes
∫ 1
−1
∫ 1
−1
λ(g(ry˜ + yk)x˜+ xk, ry˜ + yk) ∗ r ∗ g(ry˜ + yk)dx˜dy˜. (36)
Notice that the integral in (36) is now computed over the square [−1, 1]2. We now partition [−1, 1]2 into M
equally sized squares of area Axy. Let (x˜m, y˜m) represent the center of each of the M squares. The integral
in (36) is now approximated by the sum
M∑
m=1
λ(g(ry˜m + yk)x˜m + xk, ry˜m + yk) ∗ r ∗ g(ry˜m + yk) ∗Axy. (37)
A.5. Prior Choice for (κ, ξ)
Here we summarize the prior choice for (κ2, ξ) suggested by Lindgren and Rue [14]. Following the
Appendix A.1 we obtain an approximation to a Gaussian random field with Mate´rn covariance. The basis
expansion weights have variance and spatial scale hyperparameters ξ2 and κ2 (see Appendix A.1 equation
(29)). The covariance is summarized by these parameters relationship to the spatial range ρ and marginal
variance σ2 given by
ρ =
√
8
κ
, σ2 =
ξ2
4piκ2
. (38)
From (38) it is clear that the marginal variance is influenced by both κ and ξ. We would like a prior that
captures this relationship. To do so, assume (θ1, θ2) ∼ N(0,Σθ). Suppose we want the parameterization
log(ρ) = log(ρ0) + θ1 (39)
log(σ) = log(σ0) + θ2, (40)
where log(ρ0) and log(σ0) are the baseline range an marginal standard deviation. Using equations (38) and
(39) we can write
log(κ) =
1
2
log(8)− log(ρ0)− θ1 = log(κ0)− θ1, (41)
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where log(κ0) =
1
2 log(8)− log(ρ0). It follows from equations (38) and (40) that
log(φ) = log(σ0)− 1
2
log(4pi)− log(κ0) + θ2 − θ1 (42)
= log(φ0) + θ2 − θ1, (43)
where log(φ0) = log(σ0) − 12 log(4pi) − log(κ0). Equations (41) and (42) now give a joint prior on (κ, ξ)
that captures their dependent influence on the marginal variance. In Section (8) we took log (ρ0) = 0 and
log (σ0) = 0.
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